In a 4-3 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio struck
down as unconstitutional a state statute that imposed criminal
penalties on owners of vicious and dangerous dogs who fail to buy
liability insurance and take special steps to restrain and confine
their animals. The decision upheld a ruling by the 11th District
Court of Appeals that the law violated a dog owner's procedural due
process rights by not providing for an administrative hearing at
which the owner could contest a dog warden's determination that her
animals were "dangerous or vicious" and thus subject to special
restrictions.
The case arose from an October 2001 incident in which Margaret Maurer
of Ravenna was attacked and severely bitten in the driveway of her
home by two dogs that her husband identified to the local dog warden
as the German shepherds owned by a neighbor, Janice Cowan. When the
warden went to Mrs. Cowan's home to investigate, she denied that her
dogs had been out of their own yard. The warden advised Mrs. Cowan
that she believed the Maurers' version of events, and believed that
Mrs. Cowan's dogs were "dangerous" as that term is defined in state
law. The warden then gave Mrs. Cowan a verbal warning and printed
information about the state law (R.C. 955.22) that requires owners
of "dangerous and vicious dogs" to have liability insurance and take
special measures to confine and restrain their animals or face
criminal prosecution.
In November 2001 and again in January 2002, the dog warden received
new complaints from neighbors that Mrs. Cowan's dogs were running
loose in the neighborhood. Upon investigation, the warden found the
dogs in Cowan's yard but not restrained in accordance with the
statutory requirements. In response to the third complaint, the
warden filed charges against Mrs. Cowan in Trumbull County Municipal
Court for violations of the statutory restraint, confinement and
insurance requirements applicable to owners of dangerous or vicious
dogs.
After a trial during which Mrs. Cowan claimed innocence on the basis
that her dogs had not attacked Mrs. Maurer and therefore did not meet
the statutory definition of "vicious and dangerous," a jury found her
guilty of all charges and the court imposed penalties including fines
and a jail sentence. The court also ordered Mrs. Cowan to either post
a bond or surrender the dogs to the dog warden. Bond was not posted
and the dogs were subsequently seized by the warden and later
destroyed when an alternative home could not be found for them.
On review of the municipal court's decision, a three-member panel of
the 11th District Court of Appeals voted 2-1 to vacate Mrs. Cowan's
convictions on the ground that R.C. 955.22 was unconstitutional
because it did not provide an opportunity for the accused to be heard
on the issue of whether her dogs were "dangerous and vicious" prior
to the imposition of significant expenses and restraints on her
property.
Writing for the majority in today's decision, Justice Francis E.
Sweeney Sr. affirmed the 11th District's holding that R.C. 955.22
violates constitutional due process rights and is therefore
unenforceable.
Justice Sweeney cited federal and state supreme court decisions which
have held that "at its core, procedural due process under both the
Ohio and United States Constitutions requires, at a minimum, an
opportunity to be heard when the state seeks to infringe a protected
liberty or property right. … Further, the opportunity to be heard
must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
In this case, he observed, the dog warden made her decision that Mrs.
Cowan's dogs were "dangerous or vicious" based on the unsupported
word of the complaining parties, and the law provided Mrs. Cowan with
no opportunity to present contrary evidence before substantial
regulatory burdens were placed on her property. Justice Sweeney
rejected arguments advanced by the state that Mrs. Cowan's due
process rights were met because she had the opportunity to challenge
her dogs' classification at her trial, and agreed with Mrs. Cowans'
argument that delaying this challenge until she faced criminal
charges "does not offer her a meaningful opportunity to be heard
before her property rights have been infringed by state action."
"Once the dog warden made the unilateral decision to classify
appellee's dogs as vicious, R.C. 955.22 was put into effect and
restrictions were placed upon appellee and her dogs," wrote Justice
Sweeney. … "We find it inherently unfair that a dog owner must defy
the statutory regulations and become a criminal defendant, thereby
risking going to jail and losing her property, in order to challenge
a dog warden's unilateral decision to classify her property."
The majority opinion was joined by Justices Alice Robie Resnick, Paul
E. Pfeifer and Evelyn Lundberg Stratton. Chief Justice Thomas J.
Moyer and Justice Terrence O'Donnell entered separate dissenting
opinions, both of which were joined by Justice Maureen O'Connor.
In an extensive dissent, Chief Justice Moyer said the statute in
question "is not unconstitutional either on its face or as applied,"
and disputed the majority's implication that it is the determination
by a dog warden that a dog is "vicious or dangerous" that triggers an
owner's duty to comply with the statutory restraint, confinement and
insurance requirements. "R.C. 955.22 does not vest a dog warden with
authority to conclusively label any particular dog as vicious or
dangerous," wrote the Chief Justice. "(The statute) does not even
mention dog wardens … (n)or does it establish any procedural
framework, let alone an unconstitutional one."
Instead, he wrote that the vicious dog statute like state traffic
laws imposes certain duties on certain property owners under pain of
criminal prosecution whether or not a law enforcement officer has
previously issued them a warning or placed their name on a watch list
for future scrutiny. "The majority states that it is unfair for a dog
owner to be put in a position where he or she `risk[s] going to jail
and losing her property, in order to challenge' a dog warden's
decision that a dog is vicious," wrote the Chief Justice. "However …
That is the nature of every law enforcement warning. In every
criminal prosecution some person initially determines that the
accused has violated a statute … and makes a charge in accord with
that determination."
Justice Moyer described the role of the dog warden in this case as no
different than that of a police officer who warns a vehicle owner
that her car's muffler does not meet legal standards, and
later issues a citation to that motorist upon finding that the
offending muffler has not been repaired or replaced. "Certainly the
officer would not be required to provide the motorist with an
administrative hearing prior to `classifying' her as the driver of a
statutorily noncompliant vehicle and informing her of the requirement
of the law even if the driver thereafter must expend her financial
resources to repair or replace the muffler to avoid the risk of
prosecution," he wrote.
In a separate dissent, Justice O'Donnell wrote that it was the
judgment of a jury after due process, and not a unilateral
determination by the dog warden, that resulted in Mrs. Cowan's loss
of property. "… (N)othing prevented Cowan from seeking a temporary
order or other stay of any determination of the dog warden pending
trial … Here, Cowan had a full opportunity at trial to contest
charges that she owned vicious dogs. And prior to trial, she had the
opportunity to contest allegations regarding the confinement of her
animals had she chosen to do so. She did not," wrote Justice
O'Donnell.
"Requiring these dogs to be secured pending trial is not denial of
due process, but rather a reasonable measure designed to maintain
neighborhood safety pending trial," he concluded. "Accordingly I
would reverse the judgment of the appellate court."
Contacts
Victor V. Vigluicci and Pamela J. Holder, 330.297.3850, for the state
of Ohio.
Erik M. Jones, 330.376.7500, for Janice Cowan.
Please note: Decision summaries are prepared by the Office of Public
Information for the general public and news media. They are not to be
considered headnotes or syllabi of Supreme Court opinions. Full court
opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the
Reporter of Decisions:
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/ROD/documents